Behind the Veil: The Strategic Use of Religious Garb by Aksoy, O & Gambetta, D
1 
 
Behind the Veil: the strategic use of religious garb 
Ozan Aksoy
1
 Diego Gambetta 
Nuffield College & Department of Sociology European University Institute 
University of Oxford & Nuffield College 
Abstract: 
There is anecdotal evidence that since the late 20th century young, educated, and urban Muslim 
women veil more frequently and strictly. Does this imply that the classical sociological theories 
of religion, which predict that modernisation should cause a decrease in religious behaviours, do 
not apply to Islam? We investigate this question using Structural Equation Modelling to analyse 
three datasets, one from Turkey, one covering 25 Muslim countries, and one from Belgium 
where Muslims are a minority. We find that averagely religious women conform to the classical 
theories’ predictions. But among highly religious women the modernising forces – education, 
occupation and higher income, urban living, and contacts with non-Muslims – increase veiling. 
We conjecture that for highly religious women modernising factors raise the risk and temptation 
in women's environments that imperil their reputation for modesty: veiling would then be a 
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The various head-covers and dresses worn by Muslim women are collectively referred to as 
veiling.  The names and styles differ across the Islamic world, but everywhere there is a range of 
veiling types of varying degree of strictness.
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Veiling is generally taken, by the public and by social scientists alike, as a sign of 
religiosity. Yet, much anecdotal evidence indicates that from the late 20th century onward 
veiling spread chiefly among the highly educated, young, urban, middle-class women (El Guindi, 
1981; Hoodfar, 1991). If true, these accounts would pose a challenging puzzle as to why veiling 
should be increasing precisely among the women who are more exposed to such “modernising” 
forces. But, to our knowledge, there is no large-scale empirical study of veiling that corroborates 
or disconfirms these accounts.  
In this paper we investigate whether veiling is indeed more widespread among such 
highly educated, urban, middle-class women than the average Muslim women. In doing so, we 
test a number of theories, some of which explain why veiling, under certain conditions, could 
increase as the exposure to modernising forces increases. One such theory proposes that women 
decide to veil strategically, either with the intent to manage their impulses or to communicate 
their piousness to their communities, and that veiling would be a response to the “temptations” 
posed by social circumstances. We test this and other theories with an innovative approach, 
applying Structural Equation Modelling to three large scale datasets, one from Turkey, one from 
Belgium, where Muslims are a minority, and one covering 25 Muslim countries. We believe that 
this is the first systematic test of the theories of veiling. 
Veiling is not just an interesting phenomenon for social scientists, but the subject of 
extensive public controversy. Especially its stricter forms are perceived by some as an affront to 
Western values, a sign of social backwardness and women’s subjugation—so much so that strict 
forms of veiling have been banned in several European countries. Veiling has been a contentious 
issue in the Muslim world too, for a much longer time and on an incomparably larger scale. For 
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instance, compulsory de-veiling laws in Turkey and Iran and a voluntary de-veiling movement in 
Egypt in the first half of the 20th century were reversed in the late 20th century. After describing 
the theories, the hypotheses derived from them, and our findings, in the concluding section we 
address the implications of our results for cultural policy and Muslim integration in Europe. 
Theories and hypotheses  
Veiling as an outward expression of religious beliefs 
The well-established sociological theories of religion have been developed largely with reference 
to Christianity (see Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009). Nevertheless, we can use them to derive 
predictions on veiling prevalence and strictness amongst Muslim women, and test whether they 
can be successfully transposed to an Islamic context. The scientific worldview theory predicts 
that as education increases scepticism towards religious beliefs also increases (Need and De 
Graaf, 1996). Education instils the ideas of scientific rationalism, the view that natural 
phenomena can be explained by science, weakening the authority of religious beliefs. In so far as 
veiling is an outward expression of these beliefs it should decline accordingly. Similarly, 
existential security theory predicts that people in safe economic positions – with high education, 
high income and stable employment – should rely less on religion and thus veil less (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2004). Additionally, one can expect veiling to be lower among younger and single 
women, in keeping with the evidence that religiosity is less widespread in these groups 
(Tiliouine, Cummins, and Davern, 2009). Finally, social integration theory (Durkheim, [1897] 
1951; Need and De Graaf 1996) predicts that veiling should be lower in urban areas than in rural 
areas—where tighter social ties and community feelings sustain higher levels of religiosity.  
 To summarize, the classical theories predict that veiling, both in terms of prevalence and 
strictness, will be lower among women who are more exposed to the secularising effect of 
modernisation and thus become less religious. These should include women who are educated, 
employed, earning a higher income, and are young, unmarried and residing in urban areas. This 
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set of predictions constitutes our first hypothesis (H1), which will enable us to test whether the 
secularising effects posited by the classical theories, are present also in a Muslim context. 
Veiling as a strategic choice 
Classical theories of religion focus on religious beliefs, and religious behaviours, such as veiling, 
are seen as the consonant outward expression of those beliefs: if the former decline the latter 
decline too. Yet, while as a general trend modernisation may decrease religiosity, it may not 
cause universal secularisation.
2
 For women who remain religious, classical theories do not 
predict any change in veiling even if modernisation increases (or perhaps they could predict a 
decrease in veiling, in so far as modernisation, even if it does not decrease inner religiosity, may 
push religiosity into the private sphere and discourage its public displays). Yet, there are reasons 
to expect that for those who remain religious, modernising forces could have the opposite effect: 
modernisation increases women’s exposure to contacts outside of their families through higher 
education and employment, and this could put women, especially younger, urban, and single 
women, at a greater risk of abandoning their traditional mores and restraint, or even just to be 
believed to be doing so. This increased “risk and temptation” in the environment could induce 
women who care about their reputation for piety in their community, to veil or to use stricter 
types of veiling.  
The motivations could be twofold. First, veiling could be a strategy directed towards the 
self, and used as a self-binding device against temptation (Elster, 1979) – veiling would be at 
once a safeguard of women’s modesty outside the home and a deterrent against ill-intentioned 
men’s approaches. Second, veiling could be directed towards others as a strategy to 
communicate one’s persisting piety in the face of modernisation’s challenges. The more women 
interact in risky and high-temptation environments the more opportunities they have to break 
religious norms, and thus the greater is the effort they need to employ to reassure their Muslim 
community that they remain pious and honourable.  
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These strategic uses of veiling are central to two theoretical contributions, by David Patel 
(2012) and Jean-Paul Carvalho (2013). Patel models veiling as a signal that conveys information 
about women’s religiosity to their community, in particular to potential husbands. Depending on 
the environment in which women interact, more conservative and constraining veils – that is, 
"costlier" actions – might be needed to reliably signal their piety and separate them from 
deceptive signallers. In the signalling framework, the signallers do something that reveals with 
some probability their true type, in this case whether they are pious and how intensely so. 
Carvalho, in addition to signalling, models veiling as a commitment strategy which limits 
the opportunity and the temptation to break religious norms. In the commitment framework, 
women take actions to bind themselves so that even if they were inclined to misbehave they 
could not easily do so. When these actions are observable, as veiling is, they also inform the 
community of the propriety of the women. In the commitment approach, similarly to signalling, 
veiling is not necessarily a binary decision but has a continuous "strategy space" – the higher is 
the temptation in the environment the more conservative veils would be used.  
Both self- and other-directed strategic motivations, whether of the signalling or the 
commitment variety, predict that the demand for veiling will be highest among religious women 
who interact in risky and high-temptation environments. Assuming that the risk and temptation 
in the environment increases as modernising forces increase, the commitment and signalling 
approaches predict that among religious women, the intensity of veiling should be higher the 
more they are exposed to modernising forces. Hence, we expect that highly religious women 
who are more educated, employed, earn a higher income, unmarried, younger, live in urban 
areas, can be predicted to veil more. This set of predictions constitutes our second hypothesis 
(H2).  
H1 and H2 seem in contradiction. We argue, however, that they are complementary. The 
crucial twist is that H2 is conditional on high religiosity, thus refers not to the main effects (in 
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the statistical sense) of the variables, but to their interactions with religiosity. If only the classical 
theories hold, we should find that the strictness of veiling will decrease with the modernising 
factors across all levels of religiosity. If the strategic theories also hold, we should find that the 
modernising factors will increase the intensity of veiling among the highly religious.  
Both signalling and commitment are communication strategies aimed at inducing 
receivers to act in a way that benefits the signallers. These benefits are most obvious on the 
marriage market in which piety is a valuable asset. Women who can reliably signal this asset 
have a greater chance to marry and marry a wealthier husband. Singerman (1997), for example, 
reports that in Egypt "examination of a young man or woman's moral character and suitability for 
marriage begins before the engagement is publicly announced and continues until the 
consummation of the marriage" (p. 79). Moreover, "one of the compliments a young woman can 
receive from members of the community is that she possesses 'il-Hishma or modesty. [...] this 
word describes women who dress modestly and do not flirt or engage in casual conversation with 
young men" (p. 94). In addition, women’s reputation affects not only their chances of marriage, 
but also reflects on the reputation of their whole family (p. 80).  
Anthropological studies and in-depth interviews (MacDonald, 2006; Afshar 2008; 
Hoodfar, 1997:197; Maclead, 1992) lend support to a strategic use of veiling as a means to 
communicate women's piety. They show that in addition to complying with religious obligations 
the veil would be a means for women to mitigate community gossip and parental control, and to 
integrate in the economic and daily life outside their families while preserving their pious 
reputation. For example, Hoodfar (1997) reports that "[veiling] carried the notion of modernity 
without compromising the traditional and Islamic norms and values of modesty. [...] Since 
[veiled] women appear to follow the Islamic code, they can establish much more egalitarian 
relations with their male colleagues or clients without being accused of seduction" (p. 197). 
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Patel’s and Carvalho’s models seem to be supported by these ethnographic accounts of veiling, 
but what we present below is the first systematic test. 
Neighbourhood effects  
The strategic (and classical) theories of veiling yield further interesting predictions about 
neighbourhood effects. 
 Social integration theory predicts that a woman’s decision of whether and how strictly to 
veil should also be positively affected by how many and how strictly other women in her 
community veil. This effect could be due partly to a tendency to conform and partly to the cost in 
terms of social disapproval of breaking a religious norm, both of which grow as the strength of 
religious norms grows. If most women veil uniformly (this refers to variation in the 
environment) and strictly (this refers to average behaviour in the environment) in the relevant 
reference group – the whole population in Muslim countries and the Muslim co-ethnic minority 
in Western countries – a woman can infer that religious norms are widespread and well enforced, 
and inappropriate behaviours are monitored and sanctioned. In such neighbourhoods where the 
average veiling is higher and veiling variation is lower, we can expect that veiling will be higher 
(H3a). If modernisation weakens religious norms, we should then expect a decrease in veiling 
also via neighbourhood effects (i.e., by lowering average veiling and increasing veiling 
variance).  
Social integration theory further predicts that in Western countries a neighbourhood’s 
ethnic composition also matters: where natives numerically dominate, compared to areas in 
which natives are few, Muslim religious norms would be eroded. Similarly, among Muslim 
immigrants with more contacts with natives the adherence to religious norms should weaken 
(Fleischmann and Phalet, 2012; Maliepaard and Phalet, 2012; Bruenig & Fleischmann, 2015). 
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Therefore, in the Western context, veiling should decrease the larger is the share of natives in a 
woman’s neighbourhood, and the higher the number of friends she has among natives (H3b). 
At the same time, however, neighbourhood characteristics also affect the risk and 
temptation in the environment, and they too could have the opposite effect for highly religious 
women. Where religious norms are stronger, there are fewer opportunities and a lower 
motivation to break religious norms due to closer community monitoring and a higher likelihood 
of sanctions. According to the theories of veiling as a strategic choice (Patel, 2012; Carvalho, 
2013), in such neighbourhoods highly religious women can feel more relaxed and veil less 
strictly. Conversely, where religious norms are weaker and risk and temptations in the 
environment are higher, religious women should veil more frequently and strictly. We thus 
expect an interaction between neighbourhood characteristics and religiosity: the positive effect of 
average veiling and the negative effect of veiling variation on veiling will decrease as religiosity 
increases (H4a). By the same logic, where Muslims are a minority, as the number of both non-
Muslim natives and friends increase, religious norms should weaken and the risk and temptation 
in the neighbourhood should increase: as a result, highly religious women should veil more 
frequently and strictly (H4b). 
One may also expect differences between Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority 
countries. In the latter, the fear of getting discriminated or stigmatized (Helbling, 2014) increases 
the cost of veiling, and, thus, its credibility as a signal. This would be another reason why the 
presence of natives may decrease veiling among the less religious but increase it among the 
highly religious immigrants. Additionally, the predicted positive effect of living in an urban area 
(as opposed to rural) may be stunted in Muslim-minority countries as immigrants concentrate in 
urban areas where community control is stronger. We will briefly return to such potential 
differences after presenting our results.     
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Data and Method 
We use three datasets. Two datasets contain information on veiling among Turkish women in 
two countries: one from Belgium, in which Muslim are a minority, and the other from Turkey 
itself; Turkey represents an interesting case for the study of veiling being a relatively secular 
country but with a Muslim majority. The Belgian dataset is from the Migration History and 
Social Mobility survey (MHSM, conducted in 1994-6), which uses a representative clustered 
random sample of municipalities with at least 100 Turkish or Moroccan men (Lesthaeghe, 2000). 
To facilitate comparison with the Turkish dataset, we use only female Turkish respondents 
(N=850). The Turkish survey was conducted in 2007 (N=2.639) by KONDA with a 
representative stratified random sample (KONDA, 2007). 
 The third dataset is the PEW World Muslims Survey, conducted in 2011 to 2012, in 25 
Muslim countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with nationally representative 
samples in most countries (N=~16.000, PEW, 2013). When we analyze the PEW data, we will 
first restrict our attention to a subset of countries that at one point or other of their history have 
experienced some secular movement (see Table 3), where women have been exposed not just to 
religious customs and education, and are thus more likely to perceive veiling as a decision rather 
than an inescapable garb. From this subset we also exclude war torn countries, i.e. Palestine, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan; and Iran where veiling is compulsory. After analysing this subset, we will 
then provide results with the full set of countries. This will allow us to ascertain whether our 
findings generalize to other countries in the Muslim world. Further details of the datasets are 
given in the Supplementary Material. 
Measures 
The operationalization of some variables differs slightly depending on the survey. For example, 
the Belgian survey does not include veiling behaviour but the attitude toward veiling.
3
 However, 
each survey offers us information missing in another. The Belgian survey provides an 
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opportunity to test the influence of the presence of non-Muslim natives on veiling attitude. PEW 
survey records veiling sub-optimally as explained below, but is the survey of Muslim religious 
behaviour with the largest geographical coverage. Combined, the three surveys allow reasonable 
tests of all our hypotheses over a vast and diverse geographical reach.  
 Below we describe the variables whose measures are not straightforward, namely veiling, 
religiosity, and aggregate measures of veiling. Supplementary Material provides details of how 
we measure the other variables—education, work, income, marital status, age, urbanisation, 
number of natives in neighbourhood, and native friends.  
Veiling 
The Turkish survey offers the most precise and robust measure of veiling: it asks not only 
whether a woman veils outside home but also in which of four forms of increasing strictness: no-
veil, headscarf, turban, and chador. The Belgium dataset measures attitudes toward veiling with 
the question: “Muslim women should cover their head when outside home” (1=completely 
disagree to 6=completely agree). In the PEW dataset, the interviewer records whether the 
respondent was veiled during the interview, using four categories: no-veil, hijab (similar to 
turban), niqab (similar to chador), and burqa. The PEW measure is likely to be an underestimate 
because a woman who veils in public may not veil (the same extent) during the interview, in 
particular given that the interview was conducted inside the respondent’s home and the 
interviewer was a woman, as it seems to have been typically the case. We will revisit this issue in 
the results section. 
Religiosity  
We measure religiosity with a number of items.4 In the Turkish survey, we could use five items: 
self-reported religiosity plus four items asking how often a respondent performs namaz, fasts, 
prays, and reads the Quran. In the Belgian survey we measure religiosity with three items asking 
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whether “religion plays an important role in life”, whether the respondent fasts, and the 
frequency of Mosque attendance. In the PEW survey, we measure religiosity with four items: 
frequency of prayer, reading the Quran, mosque attendance; and self-reported religiosity. A 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of religiosity for the three surveys for which a latent 
religiosity measure is constructed indicates that our measures are good (Supplementary Material 
presents the CFA).  
Aggregate measures of veiling 
In each of the three surveys we calculate the average and the standard deviation of the variable 
‘veiling’ as defined above per neighbourhood. There is a methodological discussion on whether 
one can use aggregate measures of the dependent variable, especially the mean, to predict the 
dependent variable itself.5 Based on this discussion, when calculating those averages (and 
standard deviations) we exclude the subject herself because otherwise there would be an artificial 
relationship between veiling of a respondent and the average veiling in her neighbourhood. 
Excluding the subject does not fully solve the potential spuriousness of this relationship. For 
example, exogenous shocks that influence veiling in a neighbourhood, such as an Islamic mayor, 
could affect veiling of both a particular respondent and the other women in the neighbourhood. 
This issue, we believe, is less problematic in our case, for we are not so much interested in the 
association between average veiling and veiling of a respondent per se, as in the interaction 
between individual religiosity and the average veiling, which does not suffer from potential 
spuriousness to the same extent. We will revisit the issue of causal inference in the conclusions. 
Method 
We perform our statistical analyses within the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) framework 
employing the software Mplus-6 (Munthen and Munthen, 1998-2010). These means offer us 
specific advantages. First, we can deal better with measurement error by treating religiosity as a 
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latent variable measured by several items rather than constructing a factor score and treating the 
factor score as an observed variable. Next, some of the indicators of religiosity are categorical 
and Mplus allows categorical items to load on latent variables. Third, our hypotheses involve 
interactions of the latent variable, religiosity, with observed variables, such as education. Fitting 
models with latent interactions has been a challenge.6 Recent developments in Mplus have made 
latent interactions easier to handle.  
For handling missing data we used different solutions depending on the survey (Allison, 
2001). For the Turkish data, we do list-wise deletion because the missing data constitute only 4% 
of all cases. For the Belgian and PEW data, in which missings constitute about 15% and 18% of 
all cases, we imputed missings with the Expectation-Maximisation algorithm (EM) and Multiple 
Imputation, respectively. We also performed a sensitivity analysis comparing list-wise deletion 
and EM imputation for the Belgian data, and results were effectively the same. 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
In Turkey, 67% of women veil in some form (Table 1).
7
 The most common form is the less 
restrictive headscarf, and then turban. Only 1% of Turkish women wear the chador. In Belgium, 
60% (4+29+26) of Turkish women agree that women should cover their heads when outside the 
home. The average positive attitude toward veiling among Turkish immigrants in Belgium is 
thus very similar to the average number of women who veil in Turkey. The Turkish and Belgian 
samples are also very similar in terms of education, age, and occupational status. 56% of the 
Belgian sample had native Belgian friends.  
 In the PEW survey ~56% of women veiled in some form during the interview. The more 
extreme forms, niqab and burqa, were rather exceptional most likely because of how veiling was 
recorded. Religiosity indicators are not directly comparable to the other surveys since the PEW 
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items have more response categories (see Supplementary Material). Compared to the other two, 
the PEW sample is slightly older, less urbanized, and include more single women.  
[Table-1-about-here] 
Tests of Hypotheses 
We ran eight ordinal-probit regressions predicting veiling on our three datasets: four models 
include only the main effects, the other four include the interactions with religiosity (Table 2 and 
3). Because our hypotheses involve a number of variables, we jointly test their coefficients.  
The results strongly support H1 in all datasets (see Table 4 for details). When 
considering single coefficients, in Turkey only the effect of age has a different direction than 
predicted, which, however, becomes insignificant once the interactions with religiosity are 
included (Model 2) (we return to the effect of age below when we present additional analyses). 
In Belgium, all coefficients are in the expected direction, except urbanization, as we conjectured 
at the end of the theory section. In the PEW data, all coefficients estimated for both the subset 
(M5) and for all countries (M7), are in the predicted direction. 
The results strongly support H2 in Turkey and in the Muslim world, but interestingly not 
in Belgium (see Table 4). Interactions with latent religiosity are generally in the direction 
predicted by the strategic theories and are jointly statistically significant in Turkey and in the 
Muslim world both in the smaller set and in all 25 countries. In fact, the results with the subset 
and with all countries are very similar, indicating that the observed patterns are general in the 
Muslim world. These results show that, despite the fact that in the PEW data the level of veiling 
could be underestimated due to how it was recorded, the association of veiling with other 
variables holds remarkably well. The weakness of the measurement of veiling in the PEW survey 
should make the veiling measure more noisy in a direction that goes against H2, for women who 
are recorded as not veiling may in fact veil in public; thus the fact that we find strong effects, 
consistent with our other results, is reassuring. There is also an empirical way of evaluating the 
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impact of the measure shortcoming: Supplementary Material shows that once we replicate the 
analyses using the PEW data on the Turkey cases only, we obtain results very similar to the ones 
we obtain from the Turkish data.  
We will discuss possible reasons why H2 is not supported in Belgium in the concluding 
section. 
 A graphical representation of the interaction effects (Figure 1) helps us with the 
substantive interpretation of the results: for an averagely religious woman in Turkey the latent 
propensity to veil decreases by about 0.12 units for a year increase in education; but that effect 
changes with religiosity: a single standard deviation increase in religiosity neutralizes the effect 
of education on the latent propensity to veil [(-0.12) + (0.45×0.24)=-0.012], and an increase of 
two standard deviations in religiosity switches the sign of the effect of education. As for 
occupation, for an averagely religious woman having a job decreases her propensity to veil by 
about 0.42 points (equivalent to four years of education), but a single standard deviation increase 
in religiosity turns the effect of job into positive and quite substantial (~0.33). All other 
interaction effects can be interpreted in the same way using Figure 1.  
 As predicted, the average veiling in one's area is positively associated with the propensity 
to veil for the averagely religious women (H3a), while highly religious women seem much less 
responsive to the prevalence of veiling as this, we conjecture, makes the environment less 
threatening (H4a). (Figure 1 shows effect sizes and Table 4 statistical tests). On the other hand, 
greater variation in veiling has either a negative or non-existent effect for the averagely religious 
women (H3a), while for the highly religious women it increases veiling (H4a).  
To grasp what exactly variation vs. uniformity in veiling means imagine a case in which 
half of the population does not veil at all and the other half wears the burqa. Compare this with 
the case in which all women veil and wear the hijab. The average veiling is the same in both 
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cases, but the variation in veiling differs. The averagely religious woman will not veil in the first 
case, and wear the hijab in the second case. The highly religious woman, by contrast, will wear 
the burqa in the first case and the hijab in the second case. By increasing the uncertainty in the 
environment, variation seems to push the highly religious to the extreme.  
In Belgium, H3b is strongly supported: the number of Belgian friends and of native 
Belgians in one's neighbourhood both decrease veiling substantially and significantly. We also 
find support for H4b: while the number of natives in one's neighbourhood and having native 
friends decrease veiling for the averagely religious, both of them increase veiling among the 
highly religious (see Figure 1). 
[Table-2-about-here] 
[Table-3-about-here] 
[Table-4-about-here] 
[Figure-4-about-here] 
 
Additional analysis: Types of veiling 
The models above rest on the proportional odds assumption (Long, 1997:ch5), which implies 
that all three ordered dichotomization of veiling (no-veil vs. headscarf, turban, and chador; no-
veil and headscarf vs. turban and chador; no-veil, headscarf and turban vs. chador), would yield 
the same coefficients. For the Belgian and PEW data this assumption seems unproblematic (see 
Supplementary Material). But for the Turkish data we fitted additional models for different 
dichotomizations of the veiling variable to find out which form of veiling conforms more with 
our predictions, and to address the potentially problematic proportional odds assumption 
(respondents who wear the chador are too few to fit separate models for it).  
Interestingly, the results on the headscarf (Table 5) are consistent with the classical 
theories of religion–H1 is supported by Model 9 and 10. However, except income, none of the 
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interactions is statistically significant. By contrast, when the turban is contrasted with ‘no-veil 
and headscarf’ (Models 11 to 15), the interaction terms are significant. Moreover, education, 
occupational status, and income themselves without interactions with religiosity, are not always 
good predictors of the turban. A particularly interesting finding is that while age is positively 
associated with the headscarf, it has a negative effect on turban. This is probably why the main 
effect of age is insignificant in Model 2.8 We return to these results in the next section. 
 [Table-5-about-here] 
Discussion and conclusions   
Our findings support remarkably well, across many different countries and data sources, the 
predictions of the theories of veiling as both an expression of religious beliefs and a strategic 
choice. While the forces of modernization (education, income, urbanization, contact with non-
Muslim Europeans, etc.) decrease the propensity of veiling among averagely religious women, 
by subjecting highly religious women to riskier environments, especially young and single 
women, they increase the propensity of veiling. These findings show that, contrary to the 
anecdotal accounts from which we began, as a general trend veiling decreases as modernisation 
increases. However, the findings also imply that in some societies in which religiosity remains 
high enough, in line with our starting puzzle, overall veiling could in fact increase (rather than 
remaining constant) as a result of modernisation.  
These results show that for the averagely and less religious the classical theories of 
religion, developed mostly in reference to a Christian context, generalize to the Muslim context. 
To account for the veiling behaviour of the highly religious, however, the commitment and 
signalling theories are needed as veiling does not seems to be a mere expression of religiosity but 
the result of women’s strategic decision. The strategic nature of veiling is also apparent when 
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one considers the neighbourhoods effects: the lower the veiling prevalence and the higher the 
multiplicity of religious dress in a neighbourhood, the more relaxed the veiling of the averagely 
religious, but the stricter the veiling among the highly religious.   
Compared to Muslim countries, there are interesting peculiarities in Belgium, our only 
case in which Muslims are a minority. Here the most important interaction effects of religiosity 
are with variables that capture contacts with native-Belgians, i.e. the number of Belgians in one's 
neighbourhood and whether one has native Belgian friends. Other variables, such as education, 
urbanization, etc. do not interact with religiosity in predicting veiling. This could be due to the 
less precise measurement of veiling in the Belgian survey, but it could also be because where 
Muslims are a minority inter-religious contact is a more significant risk and temptation factor for 
Muslims than that measured generically by education or occupational status. The latter 
conjecture is consistent with research which has shown that contact with natives has profound 
effects on Muslim immigrants’ religious behaviour (Bruenig & Fleischmann, 2015; Maliepaard 
& Phalet, 2012).  
Since the mid-2000s, in Turkey, the turban has become a sign of politicization of 
religion, and of free religious expression whereas the headscarf resembles a traditional form of 
religiosity (Saktanber and Corbacioglu, 2008). Our additional results reflect this change: we find 
that the use of the headscarf is very well predicted by the classical theories of religion, but it does 
not seem to serve strategic functions, which are instead served by the turban. The turban rather 
than headscarf seems to be the choice of the highly religious urban women who want to 
communicate their piety when exposed to modernising forces.  
The strategic theories we test in this paper assume that veiling is a personal choice. 
However, veiling is often seen as a decision made by family or community on behalf of women 
rather than by women themselves, in other words as a result of patriarchal control (Shirazi and 
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Mishra, 2010). One could therefore object that since there is little room for women to choose 
their outfit, strategically or otherwise, our test would not be meaningful. Yet, even if the ultimate 
decision makers were not women themselves, one could argue that the theories still hold. It 
would then be the family who encourage veiling for strategic reasons, using their daughters to 
communicate their religious propriety. Our datasets do not include information on pressure 
within the family to veil, so we cannot pursue this empirically. But, interestingly, the Western 
narrative of veiling as women's subjugation is not supported by a number of ethnographic studies 
which show that veiling is often a personal choice not forced by parents or community (Afshar, 
2008; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2009; Bilge, 2010). Moreover, our findings suggest that among the 
highly religious women, veiling increases with education, income, employment, urbanity, among 
women that is who should be more resilient to family pressure.  
 We would now like to address the issue of causality. In our empirical strategy we 
measure our concepts as rigorously as possible. For example, we measure religiosity, our core 
independent variable, as a latent variable, which handles measurement error better than the 
traditional method of constructing a sum score. Moreover, we rely on three large scale datasets 
from very different contexts, and draw implications from the theories over a wide array of 
distinct outcomes, thus the remarkable convergence of our results in support of the predictions is 
reassuring. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the typical drawbacks of cross-sectional analysis, 
reverse causality and endogeneity, hence our statistical evidence must be treated as associational 
not causal. One could argue that veiled women are more likely to get less education, opt out of 
the labour market, avoid big cities, and environments with low levels of veiling, shy away from 
having contacts with non-Muslims and so on. In future research stronger validation could be 
sought in controlled designs, such as longitudinal studies,
9
 or taking advantage of exogenous 
‘shocks’, legal or political, that approximate the conditions of a natural experiment; or by testing 
18 
 
the theories’ implications on comparable behaviours in the same religion, such as beards for 
men, or on similar behaviours in other religions. We should stress, however, that while the 
conjectures of both reverse causality and endogeneity are plausible in theory, in our case they 
work against the hypotheses derived from strategic motivations (H2 and H4): they would bias 
our estimates in the opposite direction of that which we hypothesize, thus effectively imposing a 
more stringent test.  
In addition to their scholarly interest, our findings have implications for Muslim 
integration and cultural policy in Europe. The massive inflow of Muslim immigrants to Western 
countries and the rise of violent Islamist groups have made Muslim minorities a target of 
hostility and discrimination (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts, 2010; Adida et al., 2016). 
Veiling has come to visually symbolize these tensions and some forms been banned in Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and elsewhere (Helbling, 2014). Our 
results suggest, in fact, that in Europe veiling could be a sign of integration among the highly 
religious: as they have more native friends and live in areas dominated by natives, highly 
religious women tend to veil more, perhaps to keep their pious reputation while being integrated. 
Banning or shunning some forms of veiling would deprive them of a means that, contrary to 
populist cant, allow them more opportunity for integration rather than marking their 
differences.10 Not all that lies behind the veil is to be feared.  
At the same time, banning the veil is likely to cause information inefficiencies. When no 
one veils because of an imposition it would simply take a greater effort for a woman who wants 
to signal her piety and her norm abidance, to do so; she will have to seek alternative ways, which 
may be more costly, less reliable or cumbersome, and ultimately force her to stay at home.11 The 
opposite extreme of imposing the adoption of the veil, paradoxically, could have the same effect 
by making veiling uninformative: a veil would stop being taken as the genuine expression of a 
woman’s religiosity as it could simply be the outcome of complying with the law.12 This would, 
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in turn, destroy the signalling value of the veil, which would, again, force the highly religious to 
seek alternative ways of signalling their piety.  
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1
 The traditional headscarf covers the head leisurely leaving some hair visible, the turban (aka hijab) hides both the 
head and the hair. The chador (aka niqab) is a large piece of cloth shrouding the whole body, leaving only the face 
visible, the most extreme form, the burqa, covers the face too. The Arabic word Hijab means curtain but also refers 
to a specific, less conservative style, similar to the Turkish turban. For other Middle-Eastern styles see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/what-in-the-world/burqa-hijab-abaya-chador.html?_r=0. Most Western 
scholars of religion disregard these different forms and measure veiling as a binary variable (e.g. the 2006 Dutch 
SIM data). 
2
 Explaining why some women remain highly religious despite modernization is beyond this paper’s scope. We 
assume that this is the case (and also confirm with the data, see e.g., Online Supplementary Material 9 for a simple 
demonstration). No society goes (or has so far gone) completely secular even after reaching the most advanced 
levels of modernisation.  
3
 Dutch-SIM dataset measures both veiling intention and veiling (as a binary variable). Correlation between the two 
is 0.56 (p < 0.01). Supplementary Material shows the distribution of veiling intention across veiled and unveiled 
women and that intention is a good indicator of behaviour. 
4 
See Voas (2007) on measuring religiosity. 
5
 See Angrist & Pischke (2008, ch4) and Kuppens & Yzerbyt (2014). 
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6
 See Marsh, Wen, and Hau (2006). 
7
 These figures slightly differ from the ones reported in KONDA (2007) because we use only female respondents 
whereas KONDA estimates also include men whose wives veil. 
8 
These additional models break down the dataset into smaller subgroups. Hence, statistical power is lower than that 
in Model 1 and 2. 
9
 The Belgian survey is somewhat old (1994-1996) and period effects could explain why we find no support for H2 
in Belgium. We conjecture the value of veiling as a strategic device would grow as community segregation and 
discrimination increase, which is most likely to have occurred in Europe from the late 1990s onward (Adida, Laitin, 
and Valfort 2016). Such dynamics could be captured by longitudinal studies.  
10 Meyersson (2010) presents evidence that in Turkey the rule by an Islamic party increases the educational and 
occupational opportunities of Muslim women, in particular “the pious and poor”.  
11 
See Carvalho’s discussion of the consequences of a ban (2013:361). 
12
 See Aksoy & Gambetta (2015). 
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Table 1. Descriptives. 
 
 Turkey Belgium  PEW Muslim World  
  (N=2.639) (N=850) (N=15.826) 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Veiling   Wom. should veil   Veiling   
   No-veil .330     Str. disagree .168     No-veil .451  
   Headscarf .504     Disagree .186     Hijab .482  
   Turban .155     Som. disagree .054     Niqab .043  
   Chador .012     Som. agree .041     Burqa .024  
      Agree .292     
      Str. agree .258     
Religiosity   Religiosity   Religiosity   
   Self-report 2.730 .654    Self-report 5.061 1.161    Self-rep. 2.591 .682 
   Namaz 2.361 .719    Mosque 3.858 1.089     Mosque 1.728 1.887 
   Fast 2.799 .505    Fast .94        
   Pray 2.775 .458       Pray 4.443 2.214 
   R. Quran 1.974 .822       R. Quran 3.442 1.382 
   Belg. friends 0.56     
   Belg. in nbrhood 2.799 .969    
Income .823 .751    Inc (z-scr) -.032 1.011 
Age (3 categor. 
1=18/28, 
2=29/43,  
3= ≥44) 
2.030 .806 Age 29.750 8.206 Age 36.704 13.615 
Education 6.276 3.762 Education 6.510 5.079 Edu (z-scr) -.090     .992 
Urban .701  Popul. (100k) 2.487 1.577 Urban .534  
Single .163  Single  .031  Single .305  
Work .220  Work  .208     
Mean(veil) 1.835     .415 Mean(veil) 3.610 .727 Mean(veil) 1.639  .371 
SD(veil) .534     .267 SD(veil) 1.878 .290 SD(veil) .531  .199 
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Table 2: Ordinal probit SEM models predicting veiling in Turkey and in Belgium. 
 
**p(2-sided)<0.01, *p(2-sided)<0.05, +p(2-sided)<0.1, 
a
loading constrained to 1 for identification. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. In all models, standard errors are robust with respect to non-normality and clustering at the 
neighbourhood level. Disturbance variances and intercept/thresholds of items in the measurement part are 
suppressed for brevity. All continuous variables are centred. The mean of the latent religiosity variable is 
constrained to be zero for identification, thus it is cantered by default. See Online Supplementary Material SM8 for 
robustness checks.    
 
 Turkey 
 
Belgium 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
 Structural Part 
Main effects     
(R) Religiosity (Latent) 3.138** (.233) 5.175** (.940)       2.342** (.367) 2.410* (1.105) 
Education -.107** (.019) -.118**  (.021) -.858** (.196) -.948** (.259) 
Work -.546** (.156) -.420* (.182) -.494* (.205) -.692** (.198) 
Income -.208* (.087) -.319*    (.129)        
Single -.846** (.209) -.752**  (.253)      -.920** (.284) -.917** (.346) 
Age -.264** (.088) -.109      (.092)       .002 (.008)  .009 (.013) 
Urban -.138 (.108) -.264*    (.121)  .206* (.081)  .147 (.137) 
# Belgians around   -.117 (.073) -.084 (.097) 
Belgian friend   -.797** (.153) -.973** (.199) 
M.(veil) 2.079** (.185) 2.460** (.218)  .681** (.179) 1.182** (.358) 
S.D.(veil) .479** (.227) .313 (.234) -.561* (.261) -.195 (.729) 
(Latent) interactions     
R×educ  .240**   (.064)  -.439 (.542) 
R×work  1.620** (.548)        -.136 (.815) 
R×inc  1.500** (.453)   
R×single  1.597     (.984)  -.432 (1.087) 
R×age  -.565** (.223)  -.037 (.040) 
R×urban  .896*     (.359)         .575 (.497) 
R×# Belgians around     .666* (.308) 
R×Belgian friend    1.651** (.553) 
R×m(veil)  -1.336*  (.536)   .911 (1.461) 
R×sd(veil)  2.922**  (.715)        6.410** (2.366) 
Intercept     
 t1 -.194 (.301) .167 (.331) -1.829** (.341) -3.042** (.384) 
 t2 3.497** (.323) 4.201** (.377) -.256       (.275) -1.057** (.347) 
 t3 6.986** (.394) 7.823** (.477) .144        (.266) -.579 (.367) 
 t4   .432+      (.256) -.238 (.356) 
 t5   2.533**   (.402) 2.369** (.683) 
 Measurement Part 
Item loadings on R     
   Self-report 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 
   Fast 5.389** (.392) 5.424** (.401) 3.973** (1.029) 3.555** (.915) 
   Namaz 7.098** (.510) 6.938** (.488)        
   Pray 4.253** (.317) 4.149** (.313)   
   Quran 2.862** (.181) 2.769** (.182)        
   Mosque   -.830** (.097) -.804** (.075) 
Variance of R  .207** (.016)  .207** (.016) .376**   (.066) .317**  (.043) 
-LL 10917.44 10793.13 3821.83 3800.41 
N 2499 2499 850 850 
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Table 3: Ordinal probit SEM models predicting veiling in the Muslim world. 
**p(2-sided)<0.01, *p(2-sided)<0.05, +p(2-sided)<0.1; 
a
loading constrained to 1 for identification, country fixed 
effects are controlled in the model (see the Supplementary Material for those fixed effects); 
b
subset includes 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan; 
c
in addition to 
the previous subset, Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, 
Niger, Palestine, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan included. Standard errors are in parentheses. In all 
models, standard errors are robust with respect to non-normality and clustering at the neighbourhood level. 
Disturbance variances and intercept/thresholds of items in the measurement part are suppressed for brevity. All 
continuous variables are centred. See Online Supplementary Material SM8 for robustness checks.    
     
 
  
 
PEW (subset of countries
b
)  
 
PEW (all countries
c
) 
 
 M5 M6 M7 M8 
 Structural Part 
Main effects     
(R) Latent Religiosity .348**  (.069) .495** (.134) .337**  (.064) .414**  (.090) 
Education -.095*   (.044) -.100*  (.046) -.160** (.049) -.191** (.052) 
Income -.027     (.037) -.026    (.030) -.009     (.034) -.024     (.030) 
Single -.139*   (.071) -.143*  (.073) -.175*    (.080) -.210** (.079) 
Age .019**  (.003) .019** (.003) .019**  (.003) .021**   (.003) 
Urban -.126+   (.066) -.126+  (.068) -.257** (.079) -.279**  (.084) 
M.(veil) 2.444** (.184) 2.525**(.192) 3.036** (.271) 3.105** (.300) 
S.D.(veil) -0.909** (.204) -.988** (.202) -.701**  (.218) -.810**  (.277) 
Latent interactions     
R×educ  .094*   (.048)  .089*   (.041) 
R×inc  .030     (.048)  .032     (.029) 
R×single  .203** (.060)  .127** (.029) 
R×age  .004     (.003)  -.002    (.002) 
R×urban  .088     (.092)  .149**  (.046) 
R×m(veil)  -.450+  (.238)  -.592** (.155) 
R×sd(veil)  .984*   (.427)  .734*    (.288) 
Intercept     
 t1 .358*     (.153) .437*     (.173) -.497** (.106) -.007      (.324) 
 t2 3.530** (.237) 3.621** (.229) 3.294** (.299) 3.775** (.389) 
 t3 4.501**  (.207) 4.593** (.201) 4.440** (.336) 4.922**  (.447) 
  
Item loadings on R     
   Self-report .154**  (.023) .155**   (.023) 1.079** (.121) 1.081** (.121) 
   Mosque .760**  (.081) .768**   (.080) .606**   (.107) .605** (.107) 
   Pray 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 1.000
a
 (.000) 
   Quran .677**   (.070) .685**   (.068) .703**   (.077) .702** (.076) 
Variance of R 1.217** (.182) 1.198** (.182) 2.261** (.525) 2.258** (.525) 
-LL 49473.115 49449.674 113618.196 113504.490 
N 6989 6989 15826 15826 
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Table 4. Results of joint tests of coefficients involved in the hypotheses. 
 Coefficients tested 
(predicted sign) 
Turkey 
(KONDA) 
Belgium
a
  
(MHSM) 
World 
Muslims
b
 
(PEW subset) 
World 
Muslims
b
 
(PEW all) 
  
Veiling as an expression of religious beliefs (classical theories)  
H1 Education (-), Work 
(-), Income (-), 
Single (-),  
Age (+), Urban (-) 
χ
2
(6) = 125.31**  χ2(5) = 80.67** χ2(5) = 26.48** χ2(5) = 29.94** 
      
Veiling as a strategic choice  (commitment and signalling theories)   
H2 Religiosity × 
(Education (+), 
Work (+), Income 
(+), Single (+) 
Age (-), Urban (+)) 
χ
2
(6) = 83.44** χ
2
(5) = 3.96 χ
2
(5) = 21.02** χ
2
(5) = 41.68** 
      
Neighbourhood effects (predicted by classical theories)  
H3a Mean(veil) (+), 
S.D.(veil) (-) 
χ
2
(2) = 165.26** χ2(2) = 43.63** χ2(2) = 195.10** χ2(2) =  177.01** 
      
H3b Belgians around (-), 
Belgian friends (-) 
N.A. χ
2
(2) = 29.29** N.A. N.A. 
      
Neighbourhood effects (predicted by commitment and signalling theories)  
H4a  Religiosity × 
[Mean(veil) (+), 
S.D.(veil) (+)] 
χ
2
(2) = 20.25** χ2(2) = 10.39** χ2(2) = 27.37** χ2(2) = 6.20* 
      
H4b Religiosity × 
(Belgians around 
(+), Belgian friends 
(+)) 
N.A. χ
2
(2) = 9.68** N.A. N.A. 
**p(2-sided)<0.01; *p(2-sided)<0.05; 
a
income missing in the dataset; 
b
work is missing in the dataset.   
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Table 5. Binary logistic regression models predicting different types of veiling in Turkey. 
 No veil/H.scarf No veil/Turban No veil + H.Scarf / 
Turban 
 M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 
(R) Latent 
Religiosity 
3.885**      
(.376) 
4.527*     
(1.964) 
5.518**      
(.686) 
6.204* 
(2.675) 
2.433** 
(.248) 
3.084**      
(1.034) 
Education -.269**      
(.030) 
-.266**      
(.036) 
-.181**      
(.042) 
-.148** 
(.054) 
.039      
(.027) 
.010      
(.031) 
Work -.622**      
(.215) 
-.527*      
(.236) 
-.523+      
(.271) 
-.965**      
(.344) 
-.205      
(.235) 
-.270      
(.265) 
Income -.483**      
(.128) 
-.558**      
(.164) 
.045      
(.159) 
-1.062+     
(.549) 
.145      
(.102) 
-.008      
(.197) 
Single -1.291**      
(.265) 
-1.33**      
(.257) 
-.957**      
(.344) 
-.813*      
(.394) 
-0.309      
(.217) 
-.248      
(.243) 
Age .377**      
(.128) 
0.382**      
(.146) 
-.480*      
(.192) 
-.567*      
(.239) 
-.660**      
(.117) 
-.692**      
(.136) 
Urban -.844**      
(.228) 
-.808**      
(.281) 
-.603*      
(.283) 
-.892**      
(.319) 
.090      
(.192) 
.088      
(.207) 
M.(veil) 2.513**      
(.292) 
2.538**      
(.339) 
3.141**      
(.367) 
3.500**      
(.488) 
2.045**      
(.296) 
2.342**      
(.325) 
S.D.(veil) -1.662**      
(.384) 
-1.53**      
(.417) 
.791      
(.571) 
1.155*      
(.587) 
1.913**      
(.433) 
1.784**      
(.429) 
R×educ  .000      
(.157) 
 -.203      
(.232) 
 .141**      
(.068) 
R×work  1.190      
(.855) 
 3.006*      
(1.205) 
 1.502*      
(.690) 
R×inc  1.137+      
(.638) 
 4.695**      
(1.783) 
 1.223+      
(.713) 
R×single  -1.066      
(.892) 
 -2.166      
(1.274) 
 -.096      
(.847) 
R×age  -.262      
(.558) 
 .239      
(.800) 
 .289      
(.269) 
R×urban  .245      
(1.050) 
 .972      
(1.167) 
 -.130      
(.497) 
R×m(veil)  -.423      
(.952) 
 -.871      
(1.304) 
 -1.347*      
(.684) 
R×sd(veil)  .993      
(1.465) 
 .115      
(2.114) 
 1.295      
(.908) 
Intercept       
 t1 0.988*      
(.476) 
1.097+      
(.575) 
2.375**      
(.577) 
2.637**      
(.688) 
-.004      
(.020) 
-.004      
(.020) 
 t2       
 t3       
-LL 8352.08 8346.50 5222.33 5207.83 12227.91 12207.2 
N 2073 2073 1227 1227 2469 2469 
**p(2-sided)<0.01, *p(2-sided)<0.05, +p(2-sided)<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. In all models, standard 
errors are robust with respect to non-normality and clustering at the neighbourhood level. Measurement part of the 
model is suppressed for brevity. 
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Figure 1. Interactions: effects of variables on the latent propensity to veil for averagely 
religious (light bars) and highly religious (dark bars, latent religiosity scores 1.64 standard 
deviations above the mean) women. For Turkey the effect of education refers to 10-years of 
education; for Belgium only significant interactions are included; PEW effects are based on 
all countries. 
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SM1: Datasets 
The Belgium dataset is from the Migration History and Social Mobility survey (MHSM) conducted 
from 1994 to 1996. It uses a representative clustered sample in which municipalities were randomly 
selected from all municipalities with at least 100 Turkish or Moroccan men.
1
 To facilitate 
comparison with the Turkish datasets, we use only female Turkish respondents. This gives us a 
sample of 850 respondents from 26 Belgian municipalities. 
The survey from Turkey were conducted in September 2007 by KONDA. It employs a 
representative stratified random sample based on the 2000 General Census. Districts, provinces, 
neighbourhoods, and villages have been randomly sampled. 18 respondents were sampled and 
interviewed from each neighbourhood and village, subject to age and gender quotas which resulted 
in 5.291 respondents, of whom 2.639 were female.
2
 
The PEW World Muslims Survey is conducted between October 2011 and November 2012 
in 26 Muslim countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. These countries are 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, 
Palestinian Territories, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. 
Unfortunately, variable education is completely missing in Morocco due to administrative error (see 
PEW 2013). Hence, we have to exclude Morocco from our analyses, resulting a total of 25 
countries. The survey includes more than 30.000 face-to-face interviews, about 16.000 of which 
with women. The survey uses stratified area probability sampling which results in nationally 
representative samples in most countries.  
                                                          
1 For details, see Lesthaeghe (2000). 
2 For details, see KONDA (2007).   
SM2: Independent Variables 
Education 
Education is measured as number of years spent in education in the Turkish and the Belgian 
surveys. In the Belgium dataset, some respondents receive education both in the country of origin 
and in the country of destination. For such cases, the highest one is chosen. Following Smiths, 
Ruiter, and van Tubergen (2010), the number of years in education is reduced (1 or 2 years 
depending on the level) in case the respondent did not receive a diploma. 
In the PEW dataset education is measured, depending on the country, in six to 12 categories higher 
categories representing increasing years of education. To have a comparable measure of education, 
we convert these education scores to country specific z-scores by standardizing them per country. 
Unfortunately, education is missing in Morocco due to administrative error (see PEW 2013). Hence, 
we have to exclude Morocco from our analyses.  
Work 
For the Turkey and the Belgian surveys, a dummy variable codes if the respondent has been 
working at the time of the survey, either in a temporary or permanent position, with a part-time or 
full-time contract (1= works, 0=does not work). The PEW dataset does not include employment 
status.W 
Income 
Income is often, as here, a problematic variable. A coarse measurement of household income with 
five response categories is included in the Turkish survey. We recoded these five categories into 
category midpoints (in 1000 Turkish Liras per month), where the highest category (above 3.000 TL 
a month) received a value of 5. For simplicity, we treat this variable as a continuous variable. 
Unfortunately, the Belgian survey does not have an income variable, thus we could not include this 
variable for the Belgian analyses.  
The PEW World Muslims survey measures income, depending on the country, in six to 17 
categories with increasing increments of income. As with education, we convert these income 
categories into country specific z-scores by standardizing income per country. 
Marital status 
A dummy variable codes if a respondent is single or not. 
Age 
Age is measured in three categories in Turkey (1=18-28, 2=29-43, 3=44 and above). We simply 
treat this variable a continuous. The Belgian and PEW surveys include age in years. 
Urbanization 
Urbanization is measured in the following way. In the Turkish and PEW surveys, the city of the 
respondent is not given. However, the surveys do include dummy variables coding if the respondent 
lives in an urban area as opposed to a rural area (1=urban, 0=rural). We use these dummies. The 
Belgian survey includes the municipality of the respondent. We obtained data on the current 
population of the respondents’ municipality from the Directorate-general Statistics Belgium. 
Although this variable codes the current population of the municipalities and the survey is 
conducted in 1994-1996, the correlation between current populations and populations in 1990s 
would be more than 0.99.  
Number of Belgians in one's neighbourhood 
In the Belgian dataset respondents are asked about the existence of native Belgians in one's 
immediate neighborhood. The answer categories are: "1=none", "2=a few", "3=about half", and 
"4=predominantly". We treat this variable as continuous. 
Belgian friends 
The Belgian survey asks if a Turkish women has native Belgian women in her friend circle. This is 
a binary measurement where 0 indicates no Belgian friends and 1 indicates at least one Belgian 
friend.  
SM3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Religiosity 
 
In the Turkish survey, we use five indicators of religiosity. The first item directly asks how a 
respondent defines her religiosity with an ordinal response category (1= not a believer, 2=not a 
believer in religious obligations, 3= believer but not-practicing, 4=religious trying to fulfil religious 
obligations, 5=religious fulfilling all religious obligations). For this item we combined the first with 
the second category of the self reported religiosity measure due to very low number of respondents 
who answered with the first category. The other four items that measure religiosity ask how often a 
respondent performs namaz, fasts, prays, and reads the Quran (1=regularly, 2=sometimes, 3=never). 
In the Belgian dataset we measure religiosity with three items: one question asking if “religion 
plays an important role in life” (1=strongly agree to 6=strongly disagree), a question asking if the 
respondent fasts (1=yes, 0=no), and one asking the frequency of Mosque attendance (1=never to 
5=everyday).  In the PEW survey, we measure religiosity with four items comprising frequency of 
prayer (after reverse coding, 6=several times a day to 0=never), frequency of reading the Quran 
(5=every day to 0=never), frequency of mosque attendance (0=never to 6=more than once a week), 
and self-reported importance of religion in one's life (0=not at all important to 4=very important).  
In the Turkish survey, a CFA with five items loading on the latent religiosity variable yields 
a satisfactory fit (Chi-sq(5)=9.36, p(2-sided)=0.09; both CFI and TLI are larger than 0.99; the 
lowest R-square for the items is 0.39). In the Belgian dataset, religiosity is measured with three 
items with fasting as a dummy indicator. A CFA with three items and a single latent variable is 
saturated, that is, bound to fit data perfectly (Kline 2005).  For the PEW World Muslims Survey a 
CFA with four items measuring latent religiosity also yields a good fit (Chi-sq(4)=10.868, p(2-
sided)=0.004; both CFI and TLI larger than 0.99, RMSEA=0.017) . Note that in the PEW dataset a 
significant Chi-square is almost inevitable due to the large sample size (N=15.826). Other fit 
measures such as CFI and TLI all indicate good fit. The standard deviation of the latent religiosity 
variable is about 0.45 in Turkey and 0.56 in Belgium and 0.84 in the Muslim World.  
SM4: Comparison of KONDA and PEW data in Turkey  
 
In the PEW dataset, the interviewer records after the interview whether the respondent veils and if 
so to what extent in four categories. This is potentially problematic because a woman who veil 
herself in public may not be veiled (or not veiled to the same extent) during the interview, in 
particular if the interview was conducted inside the respondent’s home and the interviewer was a 
woman, as it seems to have been typically the case. When the gender of the interviewer was 
recorded in the PEW dataset (in 1.181 cases out of 38.803 total men and women respondents 
combined), the gender of interviewer and of the interviewee always matched, raising our concern 
further. PEW itself acknowledge this issue and share the veiling variable only upon request and 
with the caveat that the variable may not be appropriate for drawing conclusions on the public 
veiling status of respondents. There is an empirical way in which we can further evaluate the impact 
of the measure shortcoming. PEW dataset includes Turkey, too. We can, thus compare the 
interviewer’s observed veiling variable in the Turkish sample of PEW with the direct veiling 
measure we have in the 2007 KONDA dataset. In the latter, 67% of respondents veil (95% CI: 
65%-69%), while in the PEW dataset only 51% of women in Turkey were recorded as veiled during 
the interview (95% CI: 48%-55%). While this difference is in itself quite significant, once we 
replicate the analyses using the PEW data on the Turkey cases only, we obtain results very similar 
to the ones we obtain from the KONDA data.  
Table S1 reports the regression coefficients and suppresses other parameters for brevity. 
Results show that almost all of the main effects are significantly influencing veiling propensity, in 
the expected direction, supporting the classical hypotheses. Among the interaction effects, the 
interactions of latent religiosity with income, urbanity, average veiling, and variance of veiling are 
statistically significant as predicted by the signalling theory, and the interaction involving single is 
in the expected direction albeit insignificant. These results partially replicate the KONDA results. 
TABLE S1: Predicting Veiling in Turkey using PEW World Muslims Survey. Ordinal Probit regression 
(1=respondent did not cover her head or face, 1=covered her head, 2=covered her head and face, 3=covered 
her head, face, and eyes). Significant effects (p-2sided<0.1) in bold. 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 VEILING (INTERACTIONS) 
    R*INCOME          0.208      0.122      1.707      0.088 
    R*EDUC           -0.026      0.016     -1.594      0.111 
    R*URBAN           0.375      0.226      1.656      0.098 
    R*SINGLE          0.072      0.220     -0.326      0.745 
    R*AGE             0.001      0.005      0.279      0.780 
    R*MEAN(V)        -1.801      1.091     -1.651      0.099 
    R*SD(V)           2.549      0.804      3.169      0.002 
 VEILING  (MAIN EFFECTS) 
    R (religiosity)   0.147      0.344      0.427      0.669     
    INCOME           -0.290      0.179     -1.622      0.105 
    AGE               0.014      0.006      2.300      0.021 
    EDUC             -0.139      0.035     -3.966      0.000 
    URBAN            -0.449      0.271     -1.656      0.098 
    SINGLE           -0.674      0.225      2.989      0.003 
    MEAN(V)           2.143      0.799      2.682      0.007 
    SD(V)            -1.528      1.003     -1.524      0.128 
Variances 
    R                 1.621      0.718      2.258      0.024 
SM5: Proportional odds assumption 
This assumption implies that in an ordinal-logistic regression every ordered dichotomization of the 
four forms of veiling (e.g., no-head-cover, headscarf, turban, and chador), would yield the same 
coefficients. For three out of our four datasets this assumption is not problematic given the nature of 
the measures of veiling 
In the Belgium case the dependent variable is an ordinal attitude measure and several 
alternative specifications of those models, such as a transformed linear or binary regression instead 
of ordered logit, provide effectively identical results. In the PEW World Muslims survey there are 
very few women who wear the extreme forms of veil (see Table 1): less than 7% of women wear 
the niqab and the burqa. Hence, a binary logistic regression collapsing all veiling categories yields 
almost identical results as the ones we reported. 
The assumption is however potentially problematic in the Turkish dataset. To test this 
assumption one should ideally fit three different models (all categories vs. chador; no-head-cover + 
headscarf vs. turban + chador; no-head-cover vs. headscarf + turban + chador ), with the same main 
effects and latent interactions as in M2, and test whether all coefficients across these four models 
are equal. We tried this procedure, but some of these models failed to converge for numerical 
reasons as fitting models with latent interactions is computationally demanding. Consequently, in 
the paper we report separate analyses of different veiling types (Table 5).  
SM6: PEW World Muslims Survey country fixed effects 
Table S2 and S3 below presents country fixed-effects which are omitted in M7 and M8 in 
Table 3 for brevity as well as other model parameters which are included in Table 3. 
TABLE S2: Predicting Veiling in the PEW World Muslims Survey (subset of countries) (N=6.989). 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 Item Loadings on Religiosity 
    R_PRAY             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    R_QURAN            0.685      0.068     10.040      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.155      0.023      6.723      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             0.768      0.081      9.454      0.000 
 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  0.495      0.134      3.707      0.000 
    RINC               0.030      0.048      0.613      0.540 
    REDU               0.094      0.048      1.982      0.048 
    RURB               0.088      0.092      0.951      0.342 
    RMAR              -0.203      0.060     -3.399      0.001 
    RAGE               0.004      0.003      1.376      0.169 
    RSUM              -0.450      0.238     -1.893      0.058 
    RSDV               0.984      0.427      2.305      0.021 
 
Veiling on observed variables 
    AGE                0.019      0.003      6.563      0.000 
    EDUC              -0.100      0.046     -2.172      0.030 
    URB               -0.126      0.068     -1.849      0.065 
    MARRIED            0.143      0.073      1.966      0.049 
    SUMMV              2.525      0.192     13.152      0.000 
    SDV               -0.988      0.202     -4.889      0.000 
    INCOME            -0.026      0.039     -0.674      0.501 
 
Country Fixed Effects (Reference country=INDONESIA) 
    ALG                1.045      0.210      4.983      0.000 
    BAN                0.836      0.187      4.465      0.000 
    EGY                0.857      0.202      4.252      0.000 
    JOR                0.717      0.173      4.134      0.000 
    LEB                0.782      0.231      3.391      0.001 
    MAL                0.607      0.173      3.515      0.000 
    TUN                0.555      0.166      3.345      0.001 
    TUR                0.918      0.198      4.633      0.000 
    PAK                0.647      0.260      2.491      0.013 
 
 Intercepts 
    R_PRAY             4.920      0.098     50.371      0.000 
    R_QURAN            3.858      0.065     59.568      0.000 
    R_SELF             2.778      0.024    115.460      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             2.261      0.181     12.498      0.000 
 
 Thresholds 
    V$1                0.437      0.173      2.528      0.011 
    V$2                3.621      0.229     15.834      0.000 
    V$3                4.593      0.201     22.855      0.000 
 
 Variances 
    R                  1.198      0.182      6.584      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    R_PRAY             1.944      0.173     11.229      0.000 
    R_QURAN            0.763      0.059     13.039      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.235      0.026      9.095      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             3.128      0.161     19.470      0.000 
 
 
 
TABLE S3: Predicting Veiling in the PEW World Muslims Survey (all countries) (N=15.826).  
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 Item Loadings on Religiosity 
    R_PRAY             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    R_QURAN            0.702      0.076      9.274      0.000 
    R_SELF             1.081      0.121      8.907      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             0.605      0.107      5.640      0.000 
 Veiling ON Latent Variables 
    R                  0.414      0.090      4.581      0.000 
    RINC               0.032      0.029      1.108      0.268 
    REDU               0.089      0.041      2.201      0.028 
    RURB               0.149      0.046      3.200      0.001 
    RMAR              -0.127      0.029     -4.377      0.000 
    RAGE              -0.002      0.002     -0.908      0.364 
    RSUM              -0.592      0.155     -3.827      0.000 
    RSDV               0.734      0.288      2.544      0.011 
 
 Veiling ON Observed Variables 
    AGE                0.021      0.003      6.778      0.000 
    EDUC              -0.191      0.052     -3.665      0.000 
    URB               -0.279      0.084     -3.302      0.001 
    MARRIED            0.210      0.079      2.648      0.008 
    SUMMV              3.105      0.300     10.344      0.000 
    SDV               -0.810      0.277     -2.921      0.003 
    INCOME            -0.024      0.030     -0.803      0.422 
 
 Country Fixed Effects (Reference country=TURKEY) 
    AFG                0.073      0.181      0.406      0.685 
    ALB               -2.008      0.271     -7.422      0.000 
    ALG                0.029      0.119      0.242      0.809 
    AZE               -1.574      0.204     -7.729      0.000 
    BAN               -0.245      0.059     -4.143      0.000 
    BOS               -0.981      0.168     -5.841      0.000 
    EGY               -0.160      0.114     -1.401      0.161 
    IDN               -1.190      0.171     -6.951      0.000 
    IRN                0.035      0.192      0.182      0.856 
    IRQ                0.103      0.136      0.759      0.448 
    JOR               -0.401      0.095     -4.240      0.000 
    KAZ               -0.657      0.206     -3.181      0.001 
    KOS               -1.425      0.164     -8.674      0.000 
    KYR               -0.303      0.092     -3.288      0.001 
    LEB               -0.148      0.042     -3.538      0.000 
    MAL               -0.387      0.074     -5.217      0.000 
    NIG               -0.190      0.116     -1.636      0.102 
    PAK               -0.369      0.062     -5.967      0.000 
    PAL               -0.103      0.085     -1.206      0.228 
    RUS               -0.020      0.070     -0.285      0.776 
    TAJ                0.117      0.157      0.744      0.457 
    THA               -0.483      0.088     -5.478      0.000 
    TUN               -0.470      0.091     -5.147      0.000 
    UZB                0.196      0.119      1.644      0.100 
 Intercepts 
    R_PRAY             4.439      0.250     17.782      0.000 
    R_QURAN            3.426      0.172     19.941      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             1.726      0.232      7.443      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    R_SELF$1          -5.524      0.283    -19.501      0.000 
    R_SELF$2          -3.403      0.260    -13.095      0.000 
    R_SELF$3          -1.132      0.274     -4.136      0.000 
    V$1               -0.565      0.135     -4.174      0.000 
    V$2                3.231      0.297     10.864      0.000 
    V$3                4.380      0.347     12.626      0.000 
 Variances 
    R                  2.258      0.525      4.300      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    R_PRAY             2.651      0.355      7.466      0.000 
    R_QURAN            0.806      0.075     10.778      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             2.733      0.248     11.036      0.000 
SM7: Distribution of veiling intention among the veiled and unveiled women 
(SIM-2006 data) 
 
 
 
 
SM8: Robustness of the results with respect to excluding neighbourhoods with 
small number of observations.  
 
PEW world Muslims survey: 
In the PEW world Muslims survey, the number of cases per neighbourhood has a mean of 158.35 
and standard deviation of  137.53. Figure SM8A shows the distribution of N per neighbourhood in 
the PEW data.  There are only eight neighbourhoods with an N smaller than 10. As Table SM8A 
and SM8B show below, excluding those neighbourhoods with N < 10 or even with N < 30 does not 
change the results in any substantial way.    
KONDA: 
In the 2007 KONDA survey, the number of cases per neighbourhood has a mean of 9.17 and 
standard deviation of 1.44. Note than KONDA surveyed, on average, 18 respondents per 
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neighbourhood. Because we use only female respondents, the average number of respondents per 
neighbourhood decreases to ~9. Figure SM8B shows the distribution of N per neighbourhood in the 
KONDA survey. The majority of neighbourhoods has 9 respondents. As Table SM8C shows below, 
excluding those neighbourhoods with N < 9 does not change the results in any substantial way. (We 
did not exclude neighbourhoods with N = 9 because if we did so, we would lose the majority of 
cases.) 
Belgian survey: 
In the Belgian survey, the number of cases per neighbourhood has a mean of 86.48 and a standard 
deviation of  39.50. Figure SM8C shows the distribution of N per neighbourhood. As Table SM8D 
and SM8E respectively show below excluding neighbourhoods with N < 10 and with N < 30 do not 
change the results in any substantial way.  
Summing up, in none of the datasets excluding small neighbourhoods affects the results in any 
unexpected way. 
Figure SM8A. N per neighborhood in the PEW World Muslims Survey. 
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Figure SM8B: N per neighborhood in the 2007 KONDA survey. 
 
Figure SM8C: N per neighborhood in the Belgian HSMS survey. 
 
  
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 5 10 15 20
N per neighborhood
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 50 100 150
N per neighborhood
Table SM8A: PEW results excluding neighbourhoods with N < 10. 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Item loadings on Religiosity 
    R_PRAY             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    R_QURAN            0.662      0.070      9.448      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.259      0.026     10.040      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             0.585      0.104      5.629      0.000 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  0.393      0.081      4.830      0.000 
    RINC               0.033      0.029      1.163      0.245 
    REDU               0.086      0.042      2.042      0.041 
    RURB               0.161      0.048      3.362      0.001 
    RMAR              -0.140      0.033     -4.289      0.000 
    RAGE               0.000      0.002     -0.248      0.804 
    RSUM              -0.535      0.122     -4.378      0.000 
    RSDV               0.714      0.268      2.661      0.008 
Veiling on observed variables 
    AGE                0.020      0.003      6.702      0.000 
    EDUC              -0.172      0.055     -3.144      0.002 
    URB               -0.276      0.088     -3.145      0.002 
    MARRIED            0.209      0.087      2.416      0.016 
    SUMMV              3.060      0.340      8.996      0.000 
    SDV               -0.795      0.269     -2.955      0.003 
    INCOME            -0.034      0.032     -1.072      0.284 
Country fixed effects 
    C1                 1.368      0.287      4.759      0.000 
    C2                -0.708      0.269     -2.634      0.008 
    C3                 1.354      0.213      6.365      0.000 
    C4                -0.501      0.210     -2.389      0.017 
    C5                 0.993      0.132      7.545      0.000 
    C6                 0.355      0.163      2.179      0.029 
    C7                 1.092      0.198      5.512      0.000 
    C9                 1.308      0.290      4.505      0.000 
    C10                1.383      0.246      5.634      0.000 
    C11                0.897      0.126      7.106      0.000 
    C12                0.609      0.214      2.848      0.004 
    C13               -0.177      0.159     -1.116      0.264 
    C14                0.938      0.133      7.059      0.000 
    C15                1.111      0.141      7.857      0.000 
    C16                0.863      0.118      7.339      0.000 
    C18                1.118      0.179      6.246      0.000 
    C19                1.001      0.097     10.273      0.000 
    C20                1.241      0.175      7.093      0.000 
    C21                1.197      0.146      8.200      0.000 
    C22                1.456      0.270      5.391      0.000 
    C23                0.814      0.129      6.335      0.000 
    C24                0.799      0.091      8.822      0.000 
    C25                1.233      0.140      8.842      0.000 
    C26                1.466      0.213      6.880      0.000 
 Intercepts 
    R_PRAY             4.465      0.250     17.867      0.000 
    R_QURAN            3.467      0.166     20.856      0.000 
    R_SELF             2.600      0.063     41.203      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             1.766      0.242      7.309      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    V$1                0.638      0.176      3.619      0.000 
    V$2                4.463      0.373     11.968      0.000 
    V$3                5.604      0.427     13.127      0.000 
 Variances 
    R                  2.365      0.542      4.366      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    R_PRAY             2.493      0.366      6.809      0.000 
    R_QURAN            0.829      0.069     11.993      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.296      0.031      9.412      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             2.797      0.246     11.389      0.000 
 
  
Table SM8B: PEW results excluding neighbourhoods with N < 30.  
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Item loadings on religiosity 
    R_PRAY             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    R_QURAN            0.668      0.075      8.932      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.261      0.027      9.536      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             0.584      0.110      5.307      0.000 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  0.414      0.088      4.717      0.000 
    RINC               0.046      0.030      1.532      0.125 
    REDU               0.093      0.046      2.027      0.043 
    RURB               0.146      0.050      2.893      0.004 
    RMAR              -0.147      0.035     -4.196      0.000 
    RAGE               0.000      0.002     -0.060      0.953 
    RSUM              -0.569      0.132     -4.314      0.000 
    RSDV               0.740      0.292      2.540      0.011 
Veiling on observed variables 
    AGE                0.020      0.003      6.485      0.000 
    EDUC              -0.166      0.056     -2.949      0.003 
    URB               -0.273      0.084     -3.240      0.001 
    MARRIED            0.200      0.087      2.296      0.022 
    SUMMV              3.166      0.356      8.905      0.000 
    SDV               -0.788      0.294     -2.683      0.007 
    INCOME            -0.038      0.034     -1.109      0.268 
Country fixed effects 
    C1                 1.283      0.293      4.384      0.000 
    C2                -0.629      0.290     -2.171      0.030 
    C3                 1.295      0.218      5.953      0.000 
    C4                -0.441      0.226     -1.953      0.051 
    C5                 0.984      0.141      6.972      0.000 
    C6                 0.401      0.174      2.300      0.021 
    C7                 1.029      0.200      5.151      0.000 
    C9                 1.272      0.309      4.124      0.000 
    C10                1.329      0.254      5.232      0.000 
    C11                0.874      0.132      6.621      0.000 
    C12                0.686      0.232      2.953      0.003 
    C13               -0.119      0.170     -0.704      0.481 
    C14                0.965      0.149      6.468      0.000 
    C15                1.064      0.148      7.191      0.000 
    C16                0.855      0.127      6.737      0.000 
    C18                1.065      0.182      5.840      0.000 
    C19                1.009      0.108      9.380      0.000 
    C20                1.213      0.184      6.600      0.000 
    C21                1.276      0.166      7.687      0.000 
    C22                1.386      0.287      4.834      0.000 
    C23                0.795      0.136      5.844      0.000 
    C24                0.819      0.097      8.448      0.000 
    C25                1.240      0.152      8.143      0.000 
    C26                1.419      0.227      6.250      0.000 
 Intercepts 
    R_PRAY             4.485      0.251     17.894      0.000 
    R_QURAN            3.464      0.165     21.037      0.000 
    R_SELF             2.602      0.063     41.252      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             1.752      0.244      7.184      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    V$1                0.623      0.186      3.356      0.001 
    V$2                4.429      0.383     11.567      0.000 
    V$3                5.586      0.441     12.669      0.000 
 Variances 
    R                  2.284      0.539      4.239      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    R_PRAY             2.492      0.371      6.714      0.000 
    R_QURAN            0.841      0.074     11.418      0.000 
    R_SELF             0.300      0.032      9.286      0.000 
    R_MOSQ             2.794      0.250     11.195      0.000 
 
 
Table SM8C: KONDA results excluding neighbourhoods with N < 9.  
                                           Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Items loading on religiosity 
    RX                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    R1                 7.241      0.611     11.853      0.000 
    R2                 5.485      0.444     12.353      0.000 
    R5                 4.162      0.344     12.086      0.000 
    R6                 2.856      0.214     13.321      0.000 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  5.659      1.010      5.605      0.000 
    RINC               1.849      0.428      4.325      0.000 
    REDU               0.236      0.073      3.242      0.001 
    RURB               0.631      0.403      1.567      0.117 
    RWOR               1.138      0.580      1.961      0.050 
    RSIN               1.707      1.029      1.660      0.097 
    RSUM              -1.635      0.584     -2.801      0.005 
    RSDV               3.031      0.784      3.868      0.000 
    RAGE              -0.529      0.238     -2.227      0.026 
Veiling on observed variables 
    AGE               -0.080      0.102     -0.792      0.429 
    EDU               -0.115      0.023     -4.996      0.000 
    HINC              -0.407      0.135     -3.016      0.003 
    URB               -0.267      0.130     -2.045      0.041 
    WORK              -0.416      0.201     -2.066      0.039 
    SIN               -0.619      0.275     -2.247      0.025 
    SUMMV              2.446      0.236     10.358      0.000 
    SDV                0.520      0.248      2.097      0.036 
 Intercepts 
    RX                 2.730      0.023    121.167      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    V$1                0.219      0.362      0.604      0.546 
    V$2                4.294      0.418     10.263      0.000 
    V$3                7.755      0.511     15.183      0.000 
    R1$1              -3.806      0.260    -14.645      0.000 
    R1$2              -0.008      0.150     -0.055      0.956 
    R2$1              -5.074      0.281    -18.052      0.000 
    R2$2              -3.066      0.200    -15.361      0.000 
    R5$1              -5.455      0.241    -22.663      0.000 
    R5$2              -2.027      0.164    -12.395      0.000 
    R6$1              -0.808      0.100     -8.042      0.000 
    R6$2               0.887      0.092      9.634      0.000 
 Variances 
    R                  0.198      0.017     11.560      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    RX                 0.216      0.017     12.499      0.000 
 
  
Table SM8D: Belgium results excluding neighbourhoods with N < 10.  
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Items loading on religiosity 
    R2                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ORUC               4.216      1.077      3.914      0.000 
    MOSQUE            -0.821      0.079    -10.377      0.000 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  3.411      1.192      2.861      0.004 
    RNAT               0.729      0.362      2.013      0.044 
    RBFR               1.630      0.574      2.837      0.005 
    REDU              -0.692      0.465     -1.487      0.137 
    RWOR              -0.582      0.946     -0.615      0.538 
    RMV                1.990      1.314      1.515      0.130 
    RAGE              -0.076      0.033     -2.319      0.020 
    RMAR               0.162      0.932      0.174      0.862 
    RPOP               0.400      0.462      0.866      0.386 
    RSDV               9.866      2.443      4.039      0.000 
Veiling on observed variables 
    EDUC              -1.039      0.271     -3.831      0.000 
    WORK              -0.755      0.185     -4.070      0.000 
    MARRIED            1.003      0.405      2.477      0.013 
    MV                 1.433      0.287      5.002      0.000 
    BFRIEND           -1.023      0.199     -5.133      0.000 
    AGE                0.019      0.014      1.333      0.182 
    POP                0.069      0.115      0.597      0.551 
    NATIVES           -0.001      0.132     -0.005      0.996 
    SDV               -0.413      0.695     -0.595      0.552 
 Intercepts 
    R2                 5.063      0.130     39.090      0.000 
    MOSQUE             3.840      0.077     50.147      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    ORUC$1            -4.746      0.730     -6.499      0.000 
    V$1               -3.189      0.246    -12.963      0.000 
    V$2               -1.141      0.372     -3.067      0.002 
    V$3               -0.639      0.409     -1.562      0.118 
    V$4               -0.300      0.402     -0.748      0.455 
    V$5                2.513      0.852      2.950      0.003 
 Variances 
    R                  0.309      0.050      6.223      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    R2                 1.058      0.121      8.755      0.000 
    MOSQUE             0.990      0.085     11.581      0.000 
 
 
  
Table SM8E: Belgium results excluding neighbourhoods with N < 30.  
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Loadings on religiosity 
    R2                 1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ORUC               4.452      1.109      4.016      0.000 
    MOSQUE            -0.840      0.065    -12.879      0.000 
Veiling on latent variables 
    R                  3.498      0.985      3.550      0.000 
    RNAT               0.432      0.355      1.218      0.223 
    RBFR               1.321      0.689      1.918      0.055 
    REDU              -1.059      0.329     -3.217      0.001 
    RWOR              -0.097      0.985     -0.098      0.922 
    RMV               -3.918      3.181     -1.232      0.218 
    RAGE              -0.076      0.041     -1.853      0.064 
    RMAR               0.197      1.003      0.196      0.844 
    RPOP               2.764      1.376      2.009      0.044 
    RSDV               6.268      2.518      2.489      0.013 
Veiling on observed variables 
    EDUC              -1.095      0.258     -4.239      0.000 
    WORK              -0.604      0.197     -3.061      0.002 
    MARRIED            1.044      0.395      2.642      0.008 
    MV                 0.966      0.832      1.162      0.245 
    BFRIEND           -0.996      0.269     -3.705      0.000 
    AGE                0.023      0.014      1.576      0.115 
    POP                0.302      0.325      0.928      0.354 
    NATIVES           -0.121      0.110     -1.097      0.272 
    SDV               -0.725      0.667     -1.087      0.277 
 Intercepts 
    R2                 5.037      0.145     34.828      0.000 
    MOSQUE             3.837      0.086     44.779      0.000 
 Thresholds 
    ORUC$1            -4.805      0.727     -6.611      0.000 
    V$1               -3.081      0.266    -11.596      0.000 
    V$2               -0.967      0.453     -2.137      0.033 
    V$3               -0.454      0.465     -0.977      0.329 
    V$4               -0.127      0.435     -0.293      0.770 
    V$5                2.868      0.845      3.393      0.001 
 
 Variances 
    R                  0.302      0.049      6.151      0.000 
 Residual Variances 
    R2                 1.078      0.134      8.018      0.000 
    MOSQUE             0.950      0.083     11.439      0.000 
  
SM9: Percentage veiling among highly religious versus highly religious and 
highly educated. 
 
Here, using the PEW data (which is the largest dataset we have) we demonstrate, in a descriptive 
way, the association between one of the indicators of modernity, namely education, with veiling 
among highly religious women. As opposed to the analyses we present in the main manuscript, the 
analysis here is descriptive because of the following reasons. Firstly, here we will only show some 
bi-variate associations which do not control for other relevant variables such as income or age. 
Secondly, in our analyses in the main manuscript we treat religiosity as a latent variable. Because a 
latent variable is, by definition, unobserved, in this simple analysis we cannot identify highly 
religious women using their latent religiosity. Instead, we identify highly religious women based on 
their scores on observed variables. That is, we select women who answered the items used to 
measure religiosity with the highest possible response categories. These items are the self-reported 
importance of religiosity in one’s life, and frequencies of prayer, mosque attendance, and reading 
the Quran. We identify highly religious women in four alternative ways, corresponding to these four 
items and present results separately for each of these four alternatives. Table SM9 presents the 
distribution of veiling among highly religious women, and highly religious women who are also 
highly educated (standardized education scores > 2).  
Firstly, even among the highly religious women (irrespective of what item is used to identify the 
highly religious) there is considerable variance in veiling behaviour. That is, a considerable 
proportion (between 34% and 39%) of highly religious women do not veil. Secondly, highly 
religious and highly educated women veil more: conditional on high religiosity, the proportion of 
women who do not veil is consistently lower, and who veil is consistently higher among the highly 
educated (see dark columns). Interestingly, moreover, highly educated and highly religious women 
seem to use the most extreme form of veil (i.e. the burqa) more often than highly religious women.   
Shortly, despite being highly descriptive (and with the aforementioned caveats in mind), these 
results demonstrate our core findings we present in the main manuscript.  
Table SM9: Veiling among highly religious versus highly religious and highly educated women.  
 R(self-rep.) = 3 R(freq. pray) = 6 R(freq. Quran) = 4 R(freq. mosque) = 5 
 All educ > 2 All educ > 2 All educ > 2 All educ > 2 
% No-veil 38.27 34.84 34.44 33.85 39.31 35.23 36.40 29.73 
% Hijab 54.46 57.47 57.75 60.51 53.27 56.82 54.36 59.46 
% Niqab 4.43 3.62 4.98 2.56 4.54 3.41 5.72 5.41 
% Burka 2.84 4.07 2.83 3.08 2.88 4.55 3.52 5.41 
N 10,784 221 9,018 195 4,027 88 2,360 37 
 
